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Abstract— In July of 2013, U.S. Congressman Kennedy (D-
Mass.) successfully offered an amendment to H.R. 2687, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization 
Act of 2013. "International Participation—The President 
should invite the United States partners in the International 
Space Station program and other nations, as appropriate, to 
participate in an international initiative under the leadership 
of the United States to achieve the goal of successfully 
conducting a crewed mission to the surface of Mars." This 
paper presents a concept for an international campaign to 
launch and assemble a crewed Mars Transfer Vehicle. NASA’s 
“Human Exploration of Mars: Design Reference Architecture 
5.0” (DRA 5.0) was used as the point of departure for this 
concept. DRA 5.0 assumed that the launch and assembly 
campaign would be conducted using NASA launch vehicles. 
The concept presented utilizes a mixed fleet of NASA Space 
Launch System (SLS), U.S. commercial and international 
launch vehicles to accomplish the launch and assembly 
campaign. This concept has the benefit of potentially reducing 
the campaign duration. However, the additional complexity of 
the campaign must also be considered. The reliability of the 
launch and assembly campaign utilizing SLS launches 
augmented with commercial and international launch vehicles 
is analyzed and compared using discrete event simulation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
NASA has been analyzing strategies for human exploration 
of Mars for many years. In 2009, NASA published “Human 
Exploration of Mars: Design Reference Architecture 5.0” 
(DRA 5.0) [1] along with a detailed technical addendum [2] 
that describe an operations concept for the first human 
missions to Mars. The Mars DRA 5.0 documents represent 
the most comprehensive study for human exploration of 
Mars published to date and now serve as the point of 
departure for continued studies. 
There have been several key strategic changes since the 
2009 timeframe that are being factored into current 
analyses. Changes to NASA’s human exploration program 
since 2009 include: the cancellation of the Ares I launch 
vehicle; the replacement of the planned Ares V launch 
vehicle with the Space Launch System (SLS); and changes 
to the ground processing architecture. These changes have 
significant ramifications to the launch and assembly phase 
of missions to Mars.  
The complex nature of Mars exploration, including 
launching and assembling all the required elements in a 
timely manner to support the planned departure window, 
makes reliability analysis challenging. To assist in the 
reliability analysis, NASA has been developing an 
integrated methodology to analyze launch and assembly 
reliability. This work builds upon previous analyses 
performed for the Space Shuttle and International Space 
Station Programs [3, 4, 5], the Constellation Program [6, 7], 
the Review of Human Space Flight Plans Committee [8], 
studies performed in 2011 on launch and assembly 
reliability for human exploration missions to near-Earth 
asteroids [9] and studies performed in 2012 on launch and 
assembly reliability for human exploration of Mars [10]. 
The integrated launch and assembly reliability methodology 
starts with flight hardware manufacturing and ends with 
final departure of a Mars Transfer Vehicle (MTV) from the 
Earth assembly orbit. Pertinent risk factors are accounted for 
within a stochastic discrete event simulation for each 
integrated launch and assembly campaign. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140012705 2019-08-31T19:01:16+00:00Z
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This paper presents illustrative results from analysis of the 
launch and assembly campaign for the crewed nuclear 
thermal propulsion (NTR) MTV described in DRA 5.0 
(modified to reflect NASA’s programmatic changes since 
that time, notably the use of the SLS as opposed to the Ares 
V) and compares that result to launch and assembly 
campaigns in which commercial and international launch 
vehicles replace one or two of the SLS launches. Section 2 
introduces the complexities and risks inherent to launch and 
assembly of Mars missions. Section 3 provides a brief 
overview of the concept of operations considered by DRA 
5.0. Section 4 identifies assumptions and discusses the 
complexities inherent to replacing some of the SLS launches 
with commercial and international partner launch vehicles. 
Section 5 describes the discrete event simulation model used 
to perform the quantitative analysis. Section 6 lists the cases 
analyzed and presents the results. Conclusions and forward 
work are addressed in Section 7. 
2. COMPLEXITY AND RISKS OF LAUNCH AND 
ASSEMBLY 
The DRA 5.0 concept for human exploration of Mars 
requires multiple launches to assemble Mars Transfer 
Vehicles (MTVs) in Earth orbit. The process of completing 
all of the required launches and assembly activities will be 
complex and require significant time. There are several 
constraints that will directly impact the launch and assembly 
reliability. Foremost of these constraints is the limited 
duration of the window of opportunity for MTV departure 
from the Earth assembly orbit. Minimum energy departure 
opportunities to Mars are available from an assumed low 
Earth orbit (LEO) assembly orbit for an assumed period of 
60 days every 26 months. The actual duration of the 
departure window may be different depending upon the 
delta velocity capacity of future MTVs and the launch 
opportunity. The assembly sequence will begin long before 
the opening of the departure window. However, if the MTV 
is not assembled and functional in time for the window, the 
window is missed and the opportunity to try again would 
have to wait 26 months. MTV elements stranded in Earth 
orbit would not likely be suitable for a Mars mission after 
an additional 26 month loiter. Consequently, that investment 
would be considered lost. 
Constraints in addition to the limited departure opportunities 
include: the reliability of the launch vehicles, the amount of 
cargo up-mass and volume provided by the launch vehicles; 
the reliability and on-orbit lifetime capacity of the elements 
being placed in Earth orbit; and the ground processing 
architecture and workforce for preparing launch vehicles 
and their respective payload elements. 
The United States Congress has directed NASA to develop 
a SLS capable of placing 130 metric tons (t) into LEO. The 
mass and volumetric capacity of the 130 t SLS enables an 
MTV to be assembled with as few as 4 launches. Fewer 
launches should be better than more launches, however 
reliability and launch-to-launch spacing factors need to be 
considered in the analysis methodology for optimizing the 
overall probability of launch and assembly success. 
During the time that Mars DRA 5.0 was developed, NASA 
was planning on a robust ground processing architecture 
that made use of multiple launch vehicle integration high 
bays in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) at the 
Kennedy Space Center along with multiple mobile 
launchers and two launch pads. Since that time, NASA has 
scaled back the plans such that only a “single-string” 
capacity is being put in place. This means that there will 
only be one mobile launcher, one launch pad and one launch 
vehicle integration high bay. This concept essentially 
precludes parallel processing of multiple launch vehicles. 
In DRA 5.0, launches were planned to occur on 30-day 
centers. The planned single string architecture, along with 
planned processing on a 5 day – two 8-hour shifts per day 
(5x2), precludes this frequency of launches. SLS launch to 
launch spacing for a 130 t SLS with liquid, as opposed to 
solid, boosters is assumed to be approximately 100 days.  
Launch timeliness reliability is a significant issue since the 
Earth departure window is constrained. DRA 5.0 
acknowledged this fact by concluding that approximately 
90-180 days of margin would be inserted in the launch 
campaign plan between the last launch of the campaign and 
the opening of the Earth departure window. However, given 
the complexity of the launch and assembly campaign and 
the many delay risks, it is not clear that 90-180 days will be 
adequate. Unfortunately, there are also additional 
constraints that limit the ability to add time margin to the 
launch and assembly schedule. 
Increasing the amount of time that elements of the MTVs 
loiter in the assembly orbit adds additional risk to the 
assembly process. The probability of system failures within 
the elements or of micrometeorite and orbital debris 
(MMOD) strikes increase as loiter time is extended. In 
addition, adding margin will increase the total lifetime of 
elements. Leaving elements in space for longer durations 
prior to departure could increase the risk of failure later in 
the mission, during more critical stages. 
Crew time in space is also a major issue with adding margin 
to the launch and assembly process. Because the crew 
launch is typically the last launch in the sequence, adding 
margin between that event and the departure window will 
have the greatest benefit on reliability. However, there are 
significant issues to adding to the amount of time that crew 
must spend in space. The expected Mars mission time is 
approximately 2.5 years and already presents challenges to 
the crew. Requiring the crew to loiter at the assembly point 
prior to departure will only increase those risks. Additional 
time loitering at the assembly location also increases the risk 
that a crew health event will occur, requiring an abort back 
to Earth and thus ending the mission. 
 3 
 
In order to commit to a human mission to Mars, all of these 
constraints as well as the many risks identified below will 
have to be addressed such that there is an acceptably high 
level of confidence that the launch and assembly will be 
successful. 
Types of Risks 
The types of risks involved in the launch and assembly of 
the MTVs can be divided into two major categories: Pre-
Launch Risks and Post-Launch Risks. Pre-Launch Risks 
are those that occur prior to ignition of the main engines of 
the launch vehicle for any launch that supports the mission. 
These risks involve all of the activities required to 
manufacture, deliver, assemble, and prepare each vehicle for 
launch. Post-Launch Risks are those that occur after the 
ignition of the main engines of the launch vehicle and 
involve all of the activities required to position and 
assemble elements, deliver the crew to the MTVs, and 
prepare for departure. They are discussed in further detail in 
Section 4. 
The constraints and risks described herein require that 
missions be designed in a way that the total achieved launch 
and assembly reliability will result in an acceptable 
probability of mission success. The reliability and the 
timing of launch and assembly events must be carefully 
evaluated in order to identify and mitigate those risks. 
There is a fundamental tension between adding margin to 
the launch schedule and the amount of in-space risk 
exposure. A balance must be achieved between these factors 
in order to develop an acceptable level of overall reliability.  
This evaluation should occur in conjunction with the 
analysis and design of the launch systems and MTV 
elements. Because most of these systems and many of the 
technologies that are incorporated into them do not yet exist, 
it is still possible to influence capabilities and system 
reliabilities in order to achieve a reasonable overall 
reliability. 
3. CONCEPT OF OPERATION FOR MARS HUMAN 
EXPLORATION (DRA 5.0) 
The basic concept of operations described in Mars DRA 5.0 
was to send three Mars Transfer Vehicles (MTVs) to Mars 
as shown in Figure 1 [1]. Each of the three MTVs would 
propel one of the three major payload elements required at 
Mars to conduct the mission. These were: (1) a Mars surface 
habitat (the SHAB) that the crew uses to descend to the 
Mars surface and where they live in and work from during 
their stay on Mars; (2) a Mars descent / ascent vehicle (the 
MDAV) that is used to descend exploration gear to the Mars 
surface and then at the conclusion of the Mars surface 
mission to ascend the crew back to Mars orbit; and (3) the 
deep space transit habitat (the HAB) that the crew would 
live in during their transit from Earth orbit to Mars orbit and 
back. Figure 2 [1] provides additional detail on the Crewed 
MTV. 
Mars DRA 5.0 considered two propulsion concepts for the 
MTVs, Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) or Chemical. For 
the purposes of this paper, only the NTR case is considered. 
In the example depicted in Figure 1 the SHAB and MDAV 
were “pre-deployed” in that they were sent to Mars 26 
months prior to departure of the crew from Earth orbit. The 
analysis presented in this paper is limited to the launch and 
assembly campaign for the crewed MTV.  
DRA 5.0 describes the crewed MTV as follows. “The ‘all-
propulsive’ crewed MTV has an IMLEO of 356.4 t and an 
overall vehicle length of 96.7 m. It is an ‘in-line’ 
configuration, which, like the cargo MTV, uses AR&D to 
simplify vehicle assembly. It uses the same common NTR 
propulsion stage but includes additional external radiation 
shielding on each engine for crew protection during engine 
operation. It also includes two saddle trusses that are open 
on the underside for jettisoning of the drained [liquid 
hydrogen] LH2 drop tank and unused contingency 
consumables at the appropriate points in the mission. Four 
12.4 kWe/125 m
2
 rectangular photovoltaic arrays which are 
attached to the front end of the short saddle truss, provide 
the crewed MTV with 50 kWe of electrical power for crew 
life support, propellant tank ZBO cryocoolers and high-
data-rate communications with Earth.” [1] 
DRA 5.0 planned for four Ares V launches over 90 days to 
deliver the crew MTV vehicle components to a 407-km 
circular assembly and departure orbit. The four launches 
were: 
1 NTR “core” propulsion stage (106.2 t) 
2  In-line propellant tank (91.4 t) 
3 Saddle truss and LH2 drop tank (96 t) 
4 Supporting payload (62.8 t)  
The supporting payload launch includes: the transit habitat; 
the long-lived Orion/service module; a short saddle truss for 
connecting the habitat to the rest of the MTV; a T-shaped 
docking module (DM) that connects the contingency 
consumables container with the habitat’s rear hatch and also 
provides a docking port for delivery of the crew. Mass 
details for the crewed MTV are shown in Table 1. 
The launch order of the crewed MTV elements would begin 
with the Payload Elements, followed by the Long Saddle 
Truss & LH2 Drop Tank, the In-Line LH2 Tank, and then 
the NTR Core Stage. The crew would be launched last and 
as close to the opening of the trans-Mars-injection (TMI) as 
possible while maintaining a sufficient buffer to account for 
launch delay risk. 
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Figure 1 – Example Concept of Operations from Mars DRA 5.0 – “Pre-deployed” & NTR [1] 
 
Figure 2 – Crewed Mars Transfer Vehicle Configuration [1] 
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Table 1. Crewed MTV Mass Details [1] 
Vehicle Elements Mass (t) 
NTR Core Stage Core Stage Dry Mass 
LH2 Propellant Load 
RCS Propellant Load 
Total Core Stage Mass 
41.7 
59.7 
4.9 
106.2 
In-Line LH2 Tank In-Line Dry Mass 
LH2 Propellant Load 
Total In-Line Mass 
21.5 
69.9 
91.4 
Long Saddle Truss & 
LH2 Drop Tank 
Saddle Truss Mass 
Drop Tank Dry Mass 
LH2 Propellant Load 
Total Assembly Mass 
8.9 
14.0 
73.1 
96.0 
Payload Elements Short Saddle Truss 
Contingency Food Canister 
2nd Docking Module 
FWD RCS Prop Load 
Transit Habitat 
Long-Lived Orion/SM 
Total Payload Mass 
4.7 
9.8 
1.8 
3.2 
32.8 
10.6 
62.8 
Total Crewed Vehicle Mass 356.4 
 
Subsequent to DRA 5.0 publication, development of the 
Ares V and Ares I launch vehicles was terminated. 
However, the 130 t SLS will have similar capabilities so it is 
assumed that the crewed MTV could be assembled with four 
launches of the 130 t capable SLS. NASA is providing 
funding to multiple commercial ventures to assist in 
developing crew transportation capabilities to LEO. It is 
assumed that at least one of these ventures will be capable 
of transporting the Mars crew to the MTV assembly orbit.  
4. CONCEPT OF OPERATION FOR CONCEPTUAL 
INTERNATIONAL MISSION 
The team modified the concept of operations for DRA 5.0 to 
include commercial and international launch service 
providers. The first step is to determine the capabilities of 
the various government, commercial and international 
launch service providers. It is assumed that the parameters 
of the assembly orbit are an altitude of 400 km and an 
inclination of 28.5 degrees. The inclination assumption may 
need to be revised in the future depending upon what 
international partner launch service providers are included 
in the campaign.  The two metrics of interest are mass and 
payload volume that a launch vehicle can place in the 
assembly orbit, with volume being the limiting factor in 
most of the launches. The estimated values are shown in 
Table 2 along with the payload fairing diameters. Most of 
these values came from the payload planners guides for the 
launch vehicles.  The mass values may need to be revised 
depending upon the assembly parameter values ultimately 
chosen.  
The Falcon Heavy is currently advertised on the Space 
Explorations Technology website with a payload fairing 
identical in size (5.1m diameter, 13.1m height) to the Falcon 
9 [11]. For the purposes of this paper, it was assumed that a 
stretched fairing would be available, similar in volume 
capacity to the Delta IV Heavy. 
Table 2. Launch Vehicle Capability Metrics 
Launch Vehicle Mass 
to 
LEO 
(t) 
Payload 
Volume 
(m3) 
Fairing 
Diameter 
(m) 
SLS 
Volume 
Ratio 
SLS 130 2,026 10 1 
Falcon Heavy 
(with stretched 
fairing) 
53 224 5 1/9 
Falcon Heavy 
(with current 
fairing) 
53 156 5 1/13 
Delta IV H 23 221 5 1/9 
Ariane V 20 209 5 1/10 
Atlas V (551) 18 233 5 1/9 
Falcon 9 1.1 16 156 5 1/13 
H-IIB 16 146 5 1/14 
Delta IV M 13 146 5 1/14 
Soyuz 9 85 4 1/24 
Antares 5 85 3.9 1/24 
The volume differential between the SLS and all the other 
launch vehicles is quite significant. It will take multiple 
launches, as many as 9 to 24 depending upon the vehicles 
being used, to volumetrically replace a single Block 2 130 t 
SLS launch. This fact coupled with the fairing diameter 
reduction means that the concept of operations for the 
conceptual International human mission to Mars will need 
to be considerably different than the one described in DRA 
5.0.  
This paper will first describe a concept in which there are 3 
SLS launches as opposed to 4. The primary consideration is 
which of the three MTV elements shown in Table 1 and 
Figure 2 should be launched using the SLS launch vehicles, 
and which one should be fractionated so as to launch on 
multiple non-SLS launch vehicles. The three propulsion 
elements are dominated by large LH2 tanks. LH2 has a very 
low density of 0.071 tons per cubic meter. With a combined 
LH2 requirement of 390 tons, the volumetric requirement 
for the LH2 alone is 5,500 cubic meters. Consequently, 
focusing the three SLS launches on the propulsion elements 
is warranted. Additionally, in looking at the payload 
elements shown in Figure 2 and their respective masses in 
Table 1, a logical way to fractionate the payload elements 
can be devised.  
Table 3 shows the alternate launch vehicles that could be 
used to launch the fractionated sub elements of the payload 
elements. The mass values in Table 3 are taken from Table 
1. Additional mass will likely be required to account for the 
rendezvous, docking and assembly activities to integrate the 
fractionated sub elements on orbit. Table 3 shows that there 
is mass margin available to account for that additional 
overhead. However, while the mass constraints are satisfied 
by the alternate launch vehicles, the volumetric analysis is 
only notional at this point. It is also assumed that the HAB 
could be modified to be an inflatable design in order to be 
accommodated by a launch vehicle with a 5 meter diameter 
fairing. For this case, further analysis would need to be 
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completed to determine if there was enough volume for the 
consumables needs for the Mars mission. An additional 
launch might need to be added to account for all the 
consumables. Likewise, the actual inflation and assembly of 
the MTV might require an on-orbit assembly crew and that 
would mean more launches would be required. 
Table 3. MTV Payload Elements Fractionation 
 
MTV Payload 
Elements 
Mass 
(t) 
Alternate 
Launcher (& Mass 
Capacity (t)) 
Mass 
Margin 
(t) 
Short Saddle Truss 4.7 Atlas V (18) 13.3 
Four 12.4 kWe - 
125m2 PVAs 
* 
Soyuz (9) 9 
Zero-Boiloff Cryo 
Coolers 
* 
Contingency Food 
Canister 
9.8 Ariane V (20) 10.2 
2nd Docking Module 1.8 
HII-B (16) 11 
FWD RCS Prop Load 3.2 
Transit Habitat (HAB) 32.8 Falcon Heavy (53) 20.2 
Long-Lived Orion and 
SM 
10.6 Delta IV Heavy 
(23) 
12.4 
Total Payload Mass 62.8   
* Mass for PVAs and Cryo Coolers is not shown in 
DRA 5.0; if these are not included in the mass 
breakdown, the authors left a launch available for 
these items 
 
The launch order would begin with the Atlas V followed by 
the Soyuz. Once their respective sub-elements—Short 
Saddle Truss, Solar Power System, and the all-important 
Zero-Boiloff Cryo Coolers—are connected, then assembly 
of the remainder of the MTV including the LH2 based 
elements and the HAB can proceed. 
The second concept considered in this paper is one in which 
there are only 2 SLS launches. In addition to the MTV 
Payload Elements launched by non-SLS launches, one of 
the 3 LH2 based elements must be identified to fractionate. 
The Long Saddle Truss / LH2 Drop Tank was chosen 
because it is already fractionated to some degree. Also the 
concept of a truss with multiple tanks rather than one large 
tank lends itself to using non-SLS launch vehicles that have 
a 5-meter fairing diameter. Consequently, it is assumed that 
the optimal use of the 2 SLS launches is to place the NTR 
Core Stage and In-Line LH2 Tank in low Earth orbit.  
Given the case in which there are only 2 SLS launches 
available, the MTV configuration shown in Figure 2 is still 
supportable given some key distinctions. First, as previously 
mentioned, the HAB will need to be an inflatable. Second, 
the one large drop tank must be sub-divided. At least 4, and 
potentially more, LH2 drop tanks will be required. 
Approximately 4 5-meter class diameter tanks would be 
required to replace 1 10-meter class diameter tank of 
approximately equal lengths. The saddle truss shown in the 
figure would more likely end up being a center-line 
pentagon shaped truss with attach stations for the 4 LH2 
tanks. The truss would support a movable robotic arm that 
would be used to capture the LH2 tanks and berth them to 
their respective attach stations. 
Figure 3 shows a simple cross section of 4 LH2 drop tanks 
attached to a center-line pentagon shaped truss along with a 
stowed robotic arm. The cross sectional dimension of the 
centerline truss would be such that it would fit within a 5-m 
diameter payload fairing.  
 
Figure 3 – Cross Section Detail 
Cases with fewer than 2 SLS launches were not analyzed for 
this paper. However, the strategy for their analysis would be 
similar. A 1-SLS case would be similar to the 2-SLS case 
with the addition of needing to fractionate the in-line 
hydrogen tank. That would be done in similar fashion to 
how the LH2 drop tank was fractionated as shown in Figure 
3. A case with no SLS launches would mean that the NTR 
propulsion module would need to be fractionated. Each of 
the 3 NTR engines would need to be launched separately. 
Another launch would be required to place the thrust 
structure and main propulsion plumbing system. On-orbit 
integration of the engines with the thrust structure, fluid 
lines and electrical lines would be required. The hydrogen 
propellant tank would also need to be fractionated and 
launched on multiple vehicles. 
Table 4 provides launch campaign planning information for 
the four scenarios that were analyzed (the baseline DRA 5.0, 
the modified baseline case, and the two mixed launch 
vehicle concepts). The left column provides the number of 
days relative to the opening of the TMI window. For DRA 
5.0, the first Ares V launch would have been planned for 
270 days prior to the TMI window opening. Three 
additional Ares V launches would have followed on 30-day 
centers. A buffer of 150 days protects for Ares V launch 
delays. The Ares I crew launch was planned for 30-days 
prior to the TMI window opening. The new analysis point 
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of departure is based upon SLS launch vehicles with 
approximately 105-day spacing between launches including 
a spare launch opportunity followed by additional margin of 
105 days prior to a commercial provider launching the crew. 
The 3-SLS and 2-SLS options maintain the same SLS 
launch to launch spacing and spare opportunity, while 
adding cargo launches from commercial and international 
launch service providers. 
Table 4. Launch Campaign Plans 
 
Days Relative 
to Opening of 
TMI Window DRA 5.0
New Analysis  Point of 
Departure 3-SLS Option 2-SLS Option
60 TMI Injection Window Closes
45
30
15
0 TMI Injection Window Opens
-15 30-day crew launch buffer 30-day crew launch buffer 30-day crew launch buffer 30-day crew launch buffer
-30 Ares I: Crew Commercial Crew Commercial Crew Commercial Crew
-45
-60 Atlas V: Spare (as-needed) Atlas V: Spare (as-needed)
-75 Delta IV H: Spare (as-needed) Delta IV H: Spare (as-needed)
-90 Ariane V: Spare (as-needed) Ariane V: Spare (as-needed)
-105 Falcon H: Spare (as-needed) Falcon H: Spare (as-needed)
-120 H2B: Spare (as-needed) H2B: Spare (as-needed)
-135 Soyuz: Spare (as-needed) Soyuz: Spare (as-needed)
-150 SLS: Spare (as-needed) SLS: Spare (as-needed) SLS: Spare (as-needed)
-165
-180 Ares V: NTR Prop Module
-195
-210 Ares V: In-Line Tank Delta IV H: Orion & SM Delta IV H: Orion & SM
-225 Ariane V: Contingency Food Ariane V: Contingency Food
-240
Ares V: Saddle Truss / 
Drop Tank
Falcon H:  Inflatable Trans-
Hab
Falcon H:  Inflatable Trans-
Hab
-255 SLS: NTR Prop Module SLS: NTR Prop Module SLS: NTR Prop Module
-270 Ares V: Payload Elements
-285
-300 Atlas V: H2 Tank
-315 Delta IV H: H2 Tank
-330 Ariane V: H2 Tank
-345 Falcon H: H2 Tank
-360 SLS: In-Line Tank SLS: In-Line Tank SLS: In-Line Tank
-375
-390
-405 Falcon H: Saddle Truss
-420
Soyuz: Power System & ZBO 
Cryo-Coolers
-435
H2B:  2nd Docking Module; 
Fwd RCS Prop
-450 Atlas V: Short Saddle Truss
-465
SLS: Saddle Truss / Drop 
Tank
SLS: Saddle Truss / Drop 
Tank
-480
-495
-510
Soyuz: Power System & ZBO 
Cryo-Coolers
-525
H2B: 2nd Docking Module; 
Fwd RCS Prop
-540 Atlas V: Short Saddle Truss
-555
-570 SLS: Payload Elements
~105-Day SLS
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
~105-Day SLS
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
~105-Day 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
~105-Day SLS 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
150 days of 
MTV 
launch & assembly 
campaign 
buffer
~120 days of 
MTV 
launch & assembly 
campaign buffer
~105-Day 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
~105-Day SLS 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
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The new analysis point of departure recognizes the change 
from Ares V to SLS and the change from Ares I for crew to 
commercial crew. Additionally, previous analysis has 
demonstrated that having a spare launch vehicle and spare 
MTV elements is critical to achieving high launch and 
assembly campaign reliability [10]. For this analysis cycle it 
was assumed that 1 spare SLS launch is planned on an as-
needed basis. Likewise, the 3-SLS and 2-SLS options 
assume that each commercial and international partner will 
provide 1 spare launch vehicle on an as-needed basis with a 
30-day call-up. A 30-day call-up capability means that if a 
launch vehicle experiences a failure, then a spare launch 
vehicle can be launched as soon as 30 days later. This also 
implies that there is a ready spare for the lost payload 
element. 
5. DESCRIPTION OF SIMULATION MODEL  
A stochastic discrete event simulation model was created 
using Rockwell Automation’s Arena simulation software 
[12]. Figure 4 provides a high level overview of the model, 
which includes linkages to Excel files for inputs and results. 
The model logic includes entity routing to reflect all of the 
major processes and operations in the launch and assembly 
sequence from manufacturing completion through readiness 
and performance of the Earth departure burn, as shown in 
Figure 5. 
The simulation is run for 1,000 replications, with each 
replication representing one possible manifestation of the 
launch and assembly sequence. The only difference between 
the replications is the random numbers used to drive the 
various risk models. 
 
 
Figure 4 – Model Overview 
Excel  DRM  
Definition  
Workbook 
Discrete Event Simulation  
Arena  Model  File 
Excel  Output  
Workbook 
Analyst enters DRM information: 
• Departure window 
• Launch dates based upon workforce  
capacity, crew launch buffer and internal  
margin within each processing flow 
The DES model writes results from each of the 1,000  
replications to the Excel output file. Information includes  
control variables from the simulation, when launches  
occurred and what, if anything, caused a loss of mission.  
The Excel file automatically updates the response  
graphics that are shown in the output dashboard. 
Analyst sets control variables in the Arena file including risk factor settings.  -
Simulation logic implements all activities from manufacturing completion through departure window. Risk  
models provide opportunities for activities to be delayed or for elements to fail. 
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Figure 5 – Flight Hardware Elements Entity Routing Within Model 
Overview of Risk Models 
Manufacturing, Processing & Launch Campaign Risks—All 
elements for the Mars mission, including MTVs elements, 
launch vehicles, and propulsive elements must be 
manufactured, tested, and delivered to their respective space 
centers. Delays in these activities would delay the launch 
and assembly schedule.  
The risk of SLS manufacturing related delays was 
quantified using Space Shuttle historical data. Processing 
capabilities for the SLS at the Kennedy Space Center are 
limited by facilities and personnel constraints. These 
constraints dictate the planned launch schedule for elements. 
Delays in completing element processing and launch vehicle 
assembly could significantly impact the launch and 
assembly schedule. Delay risks through the start of launch 
countdown for the SLS launch vehicle have been previously 
described in detail [9] and were used again for this analysis.  
Non-SLS launch vehicles historical information from 
SpaceflightNow.com’s launch schedule and launch log was 
initially analyzed. Their launch schedule has about a 6-
month to one-year horizon, meaning that when a planned 
launch date is set on their schedule, the planned launch is 6 
to 12 months away. The launch schedule is updated with 
any changes to the launch date. Once the launch has actually 
occurred, the history of delays is documented in their launch 
log. The team analyzed the initial planned launch date 
versus the actual launch date to create cumulative launch 
delay distribution functions for each of the commercial and 
international partner launch service providers. The results 
are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 – Launch Delays Relative to When a Launch First Comes Onto the SpaceflightNow.com Launch Schedule 
(approximately one year out) 
The probability of launching on the originally planned date 
varies from approximately 50 percent for Soyuz to 0 percent 
for Falcon 9. Note that Falcon 9 has been launched 7 times 
thus far through December of 2013. Of more interest is how 
much margin is required to get to a high cumulative 
probability of launch. Suppose a 90% confidence of launch 
occurring within a specified time was desired. For Soyuz, 
H-II and Ariane V, the 90
th
 percentile is achieved within 
100 days or so. For the Atlas V and Falcon 9 the 90
th
 
percentile is occurring nearly a year out from the planned 
launch date. The Delta IV does not achieve the 90
th
 
percentile within a year. These results do not bode well for 
supporting a time constrained MTV assembly campaign. 
However, the authors believe that cumulative launch 
probability can be enhanced. 
First it is important to keep in mind that at the time a 
mission enters the SpaceFlightNow.Com launch schedule 
the spacecraft and launch vehicle may still be in 
manufacturing and have typically not been shipped to the 
launch site. 
Secondly, no one has ever used multiple launch vehicles to 
assemble a spacecraft in orbit that was intended to travel 
beyond Earth orbit. All spacecraft that have left Earth orbit 
have been launched on a single launch vehicle. There have 
been many planetary missions flown to date and most were 
able to launch without significant delay relative to their 
planned launch date once they got within a year of launch 
and were still on schedule. One reason for this launch 
timeliness success may be extraordinary measures that are 
taken to ensure that the departure window is not missed. 
These measures include: not committing to the mission until 
both the launch vehicle and spacecraft are go to begin 
processing; adding significant margin to the processing 
schedule; and in the case of the Space Shuttle, even 
designating a backup orbiter until it becomes clear that the 
primary orbiter is going to be available. 
Consequently, it is assumed that the first launch in the 
sequence will not be attempted if there are significant 
threats to any of the subsequent launchers and their 
respective payloads. In other words, all of the launch 
vehicles and payloads are manufactured, tested and at their 
respective launch sites in ready storage. Additionally it is 
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assumed that substantial margin is added to the launch site 
processing schedules such that it can be assumed that most, 
if not all, pre-launch countdown delay risk is mitigated. 
The next step is to determine the appropriate launch 
countdown delay risk model to use for the SLS and non-
SLS launch vehicles.  
The SLS launch countdown delay risk model used for this 
analysis is based primarily upon Space Shuttle (a.k.a. STS) 
historical data coupled with the expected differences 
between the Space Shuttle and SLS. Figure 7 shows the 
actual cumulative distribution function (CDF) created from 
the launch countdown history of 135 Space Shuttle missions 
along with the projected launch countdown delay 
distribution functions for the 105 t SLS (both crew and 
cargo variants) and the 130 t cargo SLS.  
 
 
 
Figure 7 – SLS Launch Countdown Delay Risk Models 
The projected distributions lie below the STS distribution 
for a number of reasons, including: 4 versus 3 Space Shuttle 
Main Engine (SSME) class engines; the ground 
architecture’s limited capacity, relative to the capacity 
during the STS program, to perform consecutive propellant 
loadings of the SLS; the ground architecture’s clean pad 
concept which limits the ability to perform troubleshooting 
at the launch pad and increases the likelihood of needing to 
roll-back to the VAB in the event of a technical scrub; and 
in the case of crewed launches, the need to consider the sea 
state conditions in the Orion ocean abort zones. 
These projections are subject to a fair amount of uncertainty 
today, and to change in the future, given that the SLS and 
payloads to be flown have not yet been developed, let alone 
established a launch history. For the time being they are 
believed to represent a reasonable estimate. 
For the non-SLS launch vehicles, the team encountered 
some difficulty with consistently identifying the date of the 
first launch attempt in the SpaceFlightNow.com data base. 
Consequently, the team analyzed the history of Atlas V and 
Delta IV launches for which there are multiple sources 
describing when the initial launch attempts were made. The 
team combined the data from both launch vehicles to create 
a composite launch countdown delay CDF as shown in 
Figure 8. This CDF is used for all non-SLS launch vehicles. 
It is noteworthy that this CDF is better relative to the 130 t 
SLS CDF. 
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Figure 8 – Non-SLS Launch Countdown Delay Risk Model
Ascent Loss of Mission Risk—The launch and ascent of a 
vehicle into LEO is typically one of the most risky phases in 
any space mission. Conducting multiple launches into LEO 
to support the mission means that the assembly campaign is 
exposed to this risk multiple times.  
The design concept of the 130 t SLS has not been finalized 
and there is not an official reliability requirement or 
estimate available at this time.  Consequently, the SLS 
ascent loss of mission risk was estimated by mapping 
vehicle configuration assumptions to available analog 
analysis and historical data.  The team needed to make 
assumptions regarding its likely configuration regarding 
side booster propulsion, numbers of main engines on the 
core stage, and the configuration of the upper stage. For this 
analysis cycle, it was assumed that the SLS will have liquid 
oxygen (LOX)-Kerosene based propellant side boosters 
with RD-180 class engines, 4 SSME class engines on the 
core stage, and a LOX-Hydrogen upper stage with 1 J-2X 
engine. 
The Atlas V vehicle with its RD-180 based first stage 
provides a potential analog for the reliability of the twin 
liquid boosters of the 130 t SLS. A study by the Futron 
Corporation places the expected Atlas V (401 variant) 
failure rate due to propulsion and separation events at 
1.78E-2 [13]. However, this value includes Centaur Upper 
Stage risk. Subtracting out the 1.2E-2 Centaur contribution 
yields a value of 5.87E-3 for the failure rate of the core 
stage of the Atlas V. This becomes the analog estimate for 
the SLS side stage failure rate. Since the SLS has twin side 
stages, the effective failure rate for the two side stages is 
1.17E-2. 
The ascent reliability of the SLS core stage is based upon 
the STS SSME experience of 1 SSME shutdown in 135 
missions which yields a value of 0.9975. The resulting loss 
of mission risk for an SLS core stage with 4 SSME class 
engines is 9.840E-3.  
The Saturn’s upper stage J-2 engine and Centaur upper stage 
provide useful analogs for estimating upper stage reliability 
on the 130 t SLS. The projected reliability of the J-2 engine 
was 0.988 at the beginning of the Apollo program [14, 15]. 
This equated to a projected failure rate of 1.2E-2. During 
Apollo 6, a test flight prior to manned flights, 2 engines on 
the Saturn V’s 2nd stage shut down early and the 3rd stage 
engine failed to restart.  The cause was identified and 
corrective actions were taken. The subsequent Apollo and 
Skylab flight history for the J-2 consisted of 70 engines 
being flown with 1 engine shutdown event. This represented 
an empirical engine failure rate of approximately 1.4E-2. 
The Centaur upper stage has a similar failure rate of 
approximately 1.2E-2 [16]. The analysis presented in this 
paper uses the 1.2E-2 value for the future SLS upper stage. 
Combining the side stage risk of 1.17E-2, the core stage 
engine risk of 9.84E-3, and the upper stage risk of 1.2 E-2 
yields a combined ascent probability of loss of mission 
(PLOM) value of 3.317E-2 for the 130 t SLS. 
The ascent reliability risk model for the non-SLS launch 
vehicles is based upon the previously mentioned Futron 
study that estimated Atlas V expected failure rate at 1.78E-
2. 1.78E-2 was used for all non-SLS launches. 
Automated Rendezvous & Docking Risk—Assembly of the 
MTV will require that multiple independently launched 
elements be aggregated in space. That will require some 
form of rendezvous and docking of those elements. Because 
the crew will likely not be present when most of the 
assembly events occur, the assembly will involve automated 
rendezvous and docking (ARD) events. Historically, ARD 
has proved troublesome for in-space vehicles and a number 
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of failures have occurred. Failure in the assembly of the 
MTVs could result in failure of the overall mission. The 
Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) estimated 
the probability of failure for automated docking at 1 in 97 or 
1.03E-2 [17]. 
The failure probability for crew-assisted rendezvous and 
docking with the MTV is much lower than that for the 
automated procedure. The ability of the crew to take over in 
real time mitigates much of the risk. Additionally, the 
historical data for Space Shuttle and Soyuz crew docking 
with the Mir and International Space Station (ISS) indicate a 
high level of reliability. The ESAS report estimated the 
docking failure rate at 1 in 230 or 4.35E-3 [17]. 
A related risk that has not been quantified at this point 
pertains to the reliability of electrical and fluid connections 
as well as checkout activities associated with in-space 
assembly of the fractionated elements. More work in this 
area is required for future studies.   
Element System Failure on Orbit—As elements loiter in 
LEO or at some other potential MTV assembly point, there 
is the potential that system failures will occur that result in 
loss of mission. The cumulative potential for loss of mission 
increases as the loiter period increases.  
Since the MTV elements have not been designed, built or 
operated yet, it is difficult to develop accurate risk models. 
For risk modeling during the on-orbit assembly campaign, it 
is assumed that each of the 4 major MTV elements (NTR 
Prop, In-Line Tank, Drop Tank, and Payload Elements) is 
analogous to an Earth orbiting spacecraft.  
The reliability risk model for the major MTV elements is 
based upon work done by Saleh and Castet in which they 
analyzed a select portion of Ascend’s SpaceTrak database. 
They performed a statistical analysis of 1,584 spacecraft 
launched between January 1990 and October 2008 including 
if and when the spacecraft failed. Using this information 
they developed a spacecraft reliability model (Equation 1) 
as a function of time spent on orbit. [18]. 
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From this equation the team determined the probability that 
a spacecraft would fail as a function of days spent in orbit. 
Figure 9 shows the failure probabilities over a one year 
horizon. As seen in the figure, the initial failure probability 
is relatively high but drops off sharply during the first 
month on orbit. After the first month, the failure probability 
continues to decline but at a gentler rate. 
 
Figure 9 – Spacecraft Failure Probability as a Function of Time on Orbit 
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Once established in orbit, an entity representing each major 
element of the MTV is sent to an element system reliability 
model where there is a daily chance of an element failure 
resulting in loss of mission. The daily risks of system failure 
induced loss of mission for each MTV element continue 
until the TMI burn. For the SLS-based architecture each 
SLS launch is assumed to place in orbit one major element. 
When the major elements are fractionated in order to launch 
sub-elements on non-SLS launch vehicles, their respective 
system reliability risk is also fractionated. As an example, 
the payload elements are considered one spacecraft when 
launched by the SLS. When the payload elements are 
fractionated, the HAB is given a factor of 0.6 meaning that 
it represents 60% of the payload elements failure risk. The 
solar array power system and zero boil-off cryo-cooler 
launched by the Soyuz is given a factor of 0.3. The docking 
module and forward RCS prop launched by the HII-B 
received a factor of 0.1. The short truss was assumed to 
have insignificant risk of failure. 
MMOD Caused Failures on Orbit—In previous studies, it 
has been estimated that the per element MMOD risk for 
elements in LEO is between 5.1E-6 and 5.1E-5 per day. The 
wide range in values reflects difference in element size and 
design, particularly in the amount of MMOD protection 
incorporated in the element, and differences in orbit and 
orientation. For this study a value of 1.0E-5 per MTV major 
element per day was used. This represents a somewhat 
optimistic value, reflecting the assumption that significant 
MMOD protection would be incorporated into MTV 
elements. 
Crew Medical Risk—Once the crew is launched into Earth 
orbit and up until the departure burn for Mars, there is the 
potential that a crew medical event will prompt a decision to 
return the ailing crew member to Earth. This scenario results 
in a loss of mission.  
Inputs for the crew health risk model are based upon work 
performed by NASA’s Integrated Medical Model (IMM) 
project team [19]. The IMM is being developed to respond 
to a significant need identified in NASA’s Human Research 
Roadmap [20] to quantify likelihood and consequence of 
medical conditions that could occur in spaceflight [21]. 
Based upon inputs from the IMM community, daily rates of 
7.19E-5, 9.72E-5 and 2.05E-4 LOM health events per 
astronaut-day respectively for optimistic, neutral, and 
conservative risk settings were previously used in the prior 
launch and assembly campaign analysis [9]. To reduce the 
number of simulation runs for this study, the neutral value 
was assumed for all cases. The planned date for launching 
the crew relative to the opening of the departure window 
was also held constant.  
Departure Burn Risk—The culmination of the MTV launch 
and assembly campaign is the TMI burn required to escape 
Earth orbit. The potential for failure at this point is a 
function of the reliability of the propulsion system. This is 
essentially another upper stage burn so the Centaur failure 
probability value, 1.2E-2 that was previously discussed, was 
assumed. However, the authors note that this reliability 
basis of estimate will need to be reconsidered in the future 
because of differences in the operational concept of the 
NTR propulsion element and today’s upper stages. The 
NTR element will have been loitering in Earth orbit for an 
extended duration of time, potentially a year or more. 
Today’s upper stages used to propel spacecraft beyond 
Earth orbit are typically fired within minutes or hours of 
launch. Departure burn failures, while resulting in a loss of 
mission, may still allow the crew to abort back to Earth. 
Summary of Risk Factors 
A summary of the post-launch risk factor settings for 
probability of loss of mission (PLOM) is shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. In-Flight Risk Settings 
 
Running the Model 
The simulation ends when either there has been a loss of 
mission event or the TMI has occurred. 1,000 replications of 
the simulation are executed to obtain a large data set to 
analyze. At the end of each replication, the model writes 
results in an Excel output file. In addition to writing the 
results to the output file, the deterministic inputs and 
assumptions that were used during the experiment are also 
written to the output file.  
6. RESULTS 
The 4-SLS, 3-SLS, and 2-SLS launch and assembly 
campaign options shown previously in Table 4 were 
analyzed using the model described. During the analysis 
cycle the size of the buffers and launch spacing were 
Risk Factors PLOM
130 t SLS 3.317E-02
Non-SLS launch 
vehicles
1.780E-02
Automated
(between MTV 
Elements)
1.030E-02
Crew Directed 
(Orion to MTV)
4.350E-03
1st day on orbit 2.892E-03
MMOD (per Element per day on orbit) 1.000E-05
Health (per person per day on orbit) 9.720E-05
1.200E-02
MTV Element 
reliability (per 
Element per 
day on orbit)
Rendezvous, 
Proximity
Operations & 
Docking/ 
Connection
Ascent
Continue Saleh and Castet 
reliability model (Equation 1) for 
subsequent days on orbit
Earth orbit departure 
burn by NTR propulsion module
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adjusted so as to maximize the reliability of the campaign. Table 6 shows the optimized campaigns.  
Table 6. Optimized Launch and Assembly Campaigns 
 
  
Days Relative 
to Opening of 
TMI Window
4 SLS 
+ 1 Spare SLS
+ Commercial Crew
3 SLS + 6 CIP
+ 1 Spare Each 
+ Commercial Crew
2 SLS + 11 CIP
+ 1 Spare Each 
+ Commercial Crew
60
0
28-day crew launch buffer 28-day crew launch buffer 28-day crew launch buffer
-30 Commercial Crew Commercial Crew Commercial Crew
-240 SLS: Spare (as-needed)
-300
-315
SLS: Spare (as-needed) SLS: Spare (as-needed)
Delta IV H: Orion & SM
Ariane V: Contingency Food
-330 Delta IV H: Orion & SM Falcon H:  Inflatable Trans-Hab
-345 Ariane V: Contingency Food SLS: NTR Prop Module
-390 Atlas V: H2 Tank
-405 SLS: NTR Prop Module SLS: NTR Prop Module Delta IV H: H2 Tank
-420 Ariane V: H2 Tank
-435 Falcon H: H2 Tank
-450 SLS: In-Line Tank
-495 Falcon H: Saddle Truss
-510 SLS: In-Line Tank SLS: In-Line Tank
Soyuz: Power System & ZBO 
Cryo-Coolers
-525
H2B:  2nd Docking Module; 
Fwd RCS Prop
-540 Atlas V: Short Saddle Truss
-615 SLS: Saddle Truss / Drop Tank SLS: Saddle Truss / Drop Tank
-660
Soyuz: Power System & ZBO 
Cryo-Coolers
-685
H2B: 2nd Docking Module; 
Fwd RCS Prop
-690 Atlas V: Short Saddle Truss
-720 SLS: Payload Elements
~105-Day 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
~105-Day 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
~270 days of 
MTV 
launch & assembly campaign 
buffer
~270 days of 
MTV 
launch & assembly campaign 
buffer
~105-Day 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
~105-Day 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
~210 days of MTV launch & 
assembly campaign buffer
~105-Day 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
Falcon H:  Inflatable Trans-Hab
~105-Day 
Launch-to-Launch 
Turnaround
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Figure 10 shows the 95 percent confidence interval 
estimates for the achieved level of reliability for each 
option.  The first thing to note is that the reliability is below 
0.90 for all of the options. This means that there is greater 
than a 10 percent chance that one could lose a significant 
portion, and potentially all, of the investment made towards 
a human mission to Mars. The amount of lost investment 
will depend upon when loss of mission occurs and whether 
or not launched assets could be salvaged for a future 
mission. This leads to the question of what level of 
predicted reliability will be required prior to committing to a 
multi-billion dollar launch and assembly campaign of 
international importance?  There is, at present, no official 
reliability requirement for a human mission to Mars, let 
alone the launch and assembly portion of that mission.  The 
author’s judgment is that a value well above 0.90 will be 
highly desirable.  
 
Figure 10 – Campaign Reliability Results 
The 4-SLS option has the highest launch and assembly 
campaign reliability. The 95 percent confidence intervals for 
the 3-SLS and 2-SLS cases overlap so one cannot identify 
which is better from these results. However, it is interesting 
that the 2-SLS case appears to be slightly better. The 
reduced duration of the 2-SLS case, and the corresponding 
reduced on-orbit system reliability risk, may account for the 
differential. 
While the 2-SLS and 3-SLS cases are worse than the 4-SLS 
case in terms of campaign reliability, the difference may be 
less than one would expect given the large increase in 
number of launch vehicles. Two factors serve to mitigate the 
difference. These factors are (1) the ascent reliability 
difference between the SLS and non-SLS launch vehicles, 
and (2) the fact that 1 spare was assumed for each launch 
vehicle type. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FORWARD WORK 
A capability to perform integrated launch and assembly 
campaign reliability risk for international human exploration 
of Mars has been established. While this paper has focused 
on the crewed MTV from DRA 5, the capability is 
extendable to analyze cargo missions as well as other Mars 
exploration architectures. 
An initial finding that may be particularly relevant is that it 
appears that subdividing some cargo elements of the Mars 
Transfer Vehicle is possible. 
The analytical results indicate that the all-SLS campaign for 
assembling the Mars Transfer Vehicle is more reliable 
relative to the mixed launch manifest options. However, the 
options in which 1 or 2 of the SLS launches are replaced by 
commercial and international partner launch vehicles are 
sufficiently reliable to warrant further study. Likewise, 
considering other options in which additional SLS launches 
are replaced should be analyzed for comparison as well. 
Forward work includes sensitivity analysis to having 
additional spares and potentially a spare crew launch 
capability. Having a backup launch to support a crewed 
launch is not without precedent. For the last Space Shuttle 
servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope, a second 
Space Shuttle was on an alternate launch pad ready to 
launch in case the launched mission suffered damage to its 
thermal protection system such that the crew needed to be 
rescued [22].  
A related sensitivity analysis is to reconsider the model 
assumptions regarding crew medical risks.  For example, 
what if it was assumed that the mission would not be 
aborted for an ailing crew member? It is also noteworthy 
that the assumed risk factor value of 9.72E-5 per crew 
member per day on orbit (or in space) results in a very high 
probability of loss of a crew member during the lengthy 
time from Earth orbit departure to Earth return.  Clearly, the 
crew medical risk for the overall mission will need to be 
mitigated and this will improve the launch and assembly 
campaign reliability. 
Additional forward work includes updates to risk factors 
and architecture propulsion assumptions as these have 
significant influence over the results. The team will also 
consider additional constraints and capabilities as they 
emerge from NASA and potentially commercial and 
international partner programs designing, building and 
operating the systems that will be required for human 
exploration of Mars. 
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